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Article

Induction and Epistemological Naturalism

2018-06-08

Abstract excerpt

Epistemological naturalism dismisses the notion that epistemology is a basis for the empirical sciences. In particular, it rejects the demand for a general justification of induction. Making inductive generalisations is a basic habit among humans. There is no such thing as a logic of inductive inference. The role of induction in science is heuristic; it is our way of inventing new theoretical predicates and develo...

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Identifiers and source

Literature Corpus work
c155d79e-3fae-5a18-9358-b36eb07bd0a3
DOI
10.20944/preprints201806.0143.v1
Open publication

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