Evolutionarily stable strategy in a sex- and frequency-dependent selection model.

doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.1098

Loading publication...

Noodle always counts identifier-free feature events for service operation. With your permission, Google Analytics can also estimate audience and engagement. Search text, publication identifiers, cookies, IP addresses and browser fingerprints are never included in Noodle's first-party event counters.

Privacy details

Back to search

Article

Evolutionarily stable strategy in a sex- and frequency-dependent selection model.

Journal of theoretical biology - 21 May 2000

Yi T, Lessard S, Lemire M

Abstract excerpt

In this paper, a sex-dependent matrix game haploid model is investigated. For this model, since the phenotypes of female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent, any given genotype corresponds to a strategy pair. Thus, a strategy pair is an ESS if and only if the allele corresponding to this strategy pair cannot be invaded by any mutant allele. We show that...

Topics

Alleles
Biological Evolution
Female
Humans
Male
Models, Genetic
Phenotype
Sex

Source

Open in PubMed

Identifiers

PMID: 10887901
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2000.1098

Provenance

PubMed metadata and Literature Corpus relationships. Corpus snapshot updated 30 Aug 2026.

Community interpretation

Discuss the evidence

Ask a question, add context or challenge an interpretation. Community activity is separate from scientific evidence strength.

discussions

replies

Citations encouraged

Claims remain attributable.

No discussion yet

Be the first to add a careful, cited interpretation.

Methodology Data sources Editorial policy Privacy About Contact Helena Bioinformatics